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PREFACE 
This project evolved from a desire to produce an integrated "living" data base that 
could be used to support decision makers throughout the life cycle of a complex military 
system. It represents a first step in achieving this goal. The underlying belief is that the 
quality of design and operational decisions will improve in relation to one's ability to 
discern and understand the underlying constraints of the work domain in which the 
system will operate. Constraints come in many forms and from many different sources: 
physical, physiological, organizational, social, political. Many constraints evolve and 
change over time as a system is conceived, designed, and fielded; hence the need for a 
living data base. We believe decision makers need a common foundation from which 
they can be guided by essential constraints while they make decisions that impose new 
constraints in system design and use. We speculate that essential constraints are closely 
connected to the nature of the work and the environmental context in which it is 
accomplished. However, it is a difficult task to discern and separate "essential" 
constraints from incidental ones. It is not easy to determine if a constraint is a 
consequence of old technology, a characteristic of the job problem, or based on a 
multitude of socio-technical interactions. It is not easy to discover universal principles 
that can be used to establish primacy among constraints. The research summarized in 
this report represents our initial attempt to ferret out essential constraints for the 
development of an uninhabited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), and to elucidate a 
framework that can be used both to guide the search for constraints and as a method that 
can be used to systematically represent them at different levels of abstraction. Each 
representation shows how the constraint becomes instantiated in design and operational 
decisions. In this way it both guides decision makers and serves as a tool to capture the 
consequences of their own decisions. 
This work was accomplished in support of Task 718410, Multi-Operator Systems 
Aiding. The project manager was Robert Eggleston of AFRL/HECI. The principal 
investigator for the project was John Flach working under subcontract to Logicon 
Technical Services, Inc., Dayton, Ohio. 
We wish to acknowledge the generous assistance provided by our colleagues and 
co-workers. We are deeply indebted to Jens Rasmussen. His work provides the 
intellectual foundation from which our efforts have been derived. In addition, Jens has 
provided many helpful comments throughout this project and has graciously shared 
preliminary drafts of his latest work on UCAVs. We also wish to express our 
appreciation to Paul Jacques for sharing his knowledge as an EWO; to Valerie Shalin for 
sharing her early work to develop goal plan graphs to describe the information processing 
of the EWO; to Tom Hughes for providing useful feedback on early drafts of this report; 
and to all three for providing pointers to useful data sources. Finally, we thank Anne 
Cato for her general assistance, especially her diligent work in solving cross-platform 
issues associated with format editing. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report considers the design of UCAVs for use in SEAD missions within the 
framework of Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE). The CSE framework has been 
developed as a holistic approach to human-socio-technical systems. A critical objective 
of the CSE approach is to make the significant features of a workspace (e.g., the SEAD 
mission) explicit. These significant features reflect both how the system might work 
(causal constraints) and why it is desirable for the system to work (functional constraints) 
a certain way. This explicit representation of the demands of the problem space might 
then inform the design and application of technologies (e.g., UCAVs) and the coupling of 
these technologies with human operators to reduce cognitive complexity and to increase 
efficiency and reliability in achieving the functional objectives for the system. This 
report summarizes preliminary results from a tabletop analysis of the SEAD mission and 
of available UCAV technologies. The emphasis is on understanding the situation 
constraints on performance. 
This report is the first step of a program with three explicit goals. The first goal is 
to illustrate and test the CSE framework. The second goal is to generate a database that 
will be useful for designers and managers working on the development of UCAVs for use 
in the SEAD mission. The third goal is to develop interfaces for UCAVs. These goals 
are tightly coupled in that the usefulness of the database and the ability to develop 
effective interfaces will be the true test of the CSE framework. This report is most 
relevant to the second goal. The structure of the report provides a preliminary framework 
for structuring data generated from cognitive task analyses of the SEAD mission. This 
data will be organized to reflect functional (i.e., means-ends) constraints at different 
levels of abstraction and levels of decomposition with respect to part-whole relations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
"Build and evaluate a UA Vfor the SEAD mission as an early application ofUA Vs in 
a cued attack role " 
"Increase emphasis on the development of effective human-system integration 
techniques for flight management and employment of unmanned air vehicles " 
Worch (1997) 
This report is a preliminary attempt to address the above recommendations from 
the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board's report on UAV Technologies and Combat 
Operations (Worch, Borky, Gabriel, Heiser, Swalm, & Wong, 1996). The focus is on the 
use of uninhabited air vehicles for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). This 
report outlines an approach based on Rasmussen's framework for Cognitive Systems 
Engineering (Rasmussen, 1986; Rasmussen, Pejtersen, & Goodstein, 1994) and illustrates 
the approach in the context of a localized SEAD mission. 
The introduction will provide some background on the SEAD mission, UAVs, 
and Cognitive Systems Engineering (CSE). The later sections will provide more in-depth 
analyses of the SEAD mission. These analyses are primarily based on a search of 
archival records on the SEAD mission, on electronic warfare, and on UAVs. As such, it 
is only a first step.   However, we think that it is a positive first step that will lay the 
groundwork for more thorough cognitive task analyses.   The goal of CSE is to develop 
integrated interfaces and user-aiding subsystems to support human operators so that they 
can be responsive to the meaningful properties of work situations; and thus, perform as 
effective controllers and problem solvers (Also see Rasmussen, 1998 for related 
discussions). 
I.A. SEAD 
"Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) is any activity that neutralizes, 
destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy surface-based defenses by destructive and/or 
disruptive means" (Joint Pub 3-01.4,1995). The SEAD mission is in the process of 
evolution. This evolution reflects the changing technology of both surface-based defense 
systems and the technology available for attacking these systems. 
The beginnings of the SEAD mission can be traced to the first uses of aircraft 
(i.e., balloons) in the American Civil War and the Franco Prussian War. From that 
time on there has been a duel for control of the third dimension between those on the 
ground and those in the air. The combination of physical and electronic measures, 
counter-measures, and counter-counter-measures that characterize the modern SEAD 
mission evolved as a response to the SA-2 SAM (surface to air missile) threat that 
arose during the Vietnam War:' 
Aircrews had dealt with threats —fighters and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) — since 
the beginnings of the use of aircraft in combat, but the introduction of the Soviet-built 
SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) ushered a new and deadly threat into an air war 
over Vietnam. Although the SA-2 was not an unexpected threat — having earlier 
shot down two American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft — the US Air Force's tactical 
forces were largely unprepared.   (Hewitt, 1993) 
The SAM threat was countered by the development of the Wild Weasel — an 
aircraft (recently an F-4G, more currently an F-16 block 50 series) configured with 
electronics for detecting and homing on radar emissions from SAM sites (for the F-16 
this is the HARM Targeting System — HTS). The SEAD mission was an extremely 
dangerous mission since the airframe and aircrew were often required to operate within 
range of the surface threats that they were trying to suppress. The SEAD aircraft tried to 
fly close enough so that the enemy would turn on the targeting radar, but not close 
enough for them to take a high probability shot. This was referred to as "stimulating the 
environment." This was a dangerous game, particularly, when there were unknown 
threats in the area of engagement. 
In many respects, the approach to SAMs in Vietnam was "piecemeal" (Brungess, 
1994). The integrated air defense system (IADS) developed by the North Vietnamese, 
however, was not a simple collection of SAMs, but a highly integrated system. Brungess 
(1994) describes this system: 
During the technological chess game between the US and the Soviet-equipped North 
Vietnamese, a qualitative change took place in the North Vietnamese IADS that the 
US was slow to recognize. The strategy of air deniability in mid-1968 included 250 
ground controlled interceptors (GCI), 1,500 radar-directed and optical AAA sites, 
and over 300 SAM sites netted together by a centrally controlled and directed 
integrated structure. A sophisticated early-warning radar net consisting of the latest 
Soviet radars, communications apparatus, passive detection nets, and intelligence- 
gathering agencies fed an increasingly integrated air defense network. From the 
North Vietnamese view, the IADS was an indivisible organization composed of 
interdependent, interlocking parts comprising a complete "nervous system " and 
associated striking "muscle" (p. 8). 
Table L:   SEAD in the Gulf War (from Brungess, 1994) 
Threat Most formidable faced by American military based on capability, numbers, command and control structure and 
modernization. 
Countrywide radar-warning net consists of multiple Western-designed and Soviet radar systems tied together with 
redundant and hardened command, control, and communications (C3) net. Advanced computer technology employed 
in target tracking, weapons allocation, and sector control. 
Iraqi air force, AAA, and SAM systems fully integrated. 
Frontline personnel well trained, secondary back-up echelon poorly trained. 
Doctrinally tied to "weapons close-hold" use; poor discipline results in random, wasteful use of weapons. 
Defini- 
tion 
Campaign-based SEAD. Use of all aircraft to execute SEAD campaign. Difference between way campaign was 
defined and way it was executed. Definition separated offensive counter air (air-to-air) and SEAD (suppression of 
radars). Executed as single, coordinated IADS attack plan. 
Distinction drawn between tactical and strategic SEAD. Tactical SEAD related to day-to-day suppression of 
battlefield operations against Iraqi field army. Strategic SEAD directed at degradation of overall Iraqi IADS. 
Tactics Full spectrum, Electronic combat-based tactical deception, integrated use of EF-11 l/EA-6, HARM shooters (F-4G, 
F-16C, Navy aircraft). Near real-time relay of critical electronic combat data coordinated through AWACS, E-3, 
RC/EC-135, E-2C, prototype JSTARS. 
Neo-Iron Hand tactics against known sites using combination of jamming, ARMs, standoff ordinance (glide bombs, 
Mavericks, Hellfire missiles, cluster bomb units, or general-purpose bombs). 
Organi- 
zation 
Centralized control, decentralized execution. Strategy, general battle plan tactics developed by joint coalition staff. 
Specific elements of plan tasked to specific units. 
Developed as war-planning organization as opposed to raid or campaign of Libya or Bekka Valley operations. 
Heavily dependent on reliable, efficient communications among forces to make organization viable. 
Force 
Structure 
Very heavy emphasis (above 50% of force) dedicated to SEAD effort during initial phases. Actual percentage of 
SEAD-specific assets very small (EF-111s, EA-6s, F-4Gs, EC-130Hs accounted for less than 3% of total air forces). 
Specialization of SEAD assets diminished, emphasis on object of SEAD campaign with whatever assets could 
perform task. 
Strategy Highly evolved SEAD strategy. Multileveled from strategic to tactical, from specialized function to general 
campaign. Integrated with doctrine. 
Plan: destabilize the Iraqi IADS and keep it destabilized. Neutralize those portions that pose a threat to attackers, 
deny their IADS the use of electromagnetic spectrum, while exploiting other elements of the spectrum for deception 
and intelligence-gathering purposes. 
An extended use of Libyan raid mentality. By relentlessly keeping pressure on IADS through jamming, ARMs, 
selected Iron Hand attacks, seized the initiative by maximizing confusion. Instead of 11 minutes of confusion, there 
were six weeks. 
The intentional shaping of the electronic battlefield. A use of air-land battle concept extended in three dimensions 
and encompassing the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Variation of Navy's "electronic combat rollback" emphasizing versatile use of aircraft in executing SEAD. 
Based on striking first, prepared to repel attack if it came and retake initiative. 
Doctrine AFM 1-1,16 Mar 84, in force during the Gulf War. SEAD subsumed as element of counter air, and also element of 
electronic combat. Joint doctrine separated JSEAD from C3CM, and subsumed electronic warfare under C3CM. 
Desert Storm combined elements of both in strategic/tactical applications. 
Tech- 
nology 
Very sophisticated technology used by both sides. Technology fairly evenly matched. 
SAMs employed latest Soviet/Western guidance techniques and electronic counter-countermeasure advances. 
Fiber optics, highly directional microwave communication net, state of the art. 
Iraqi fighters practiced fully coordinated night GCI operations using latest Soviet and French fighters and air-to-air 
missiles. 
Technology too sophisticated to tackle immediately; months-long preparation required, in some cases, to design 
specific counters. 
US use of digitally reprogrammable equipment critical to success of adapting to rapid changes in Iraqi use of 
electromagnetic spectrum (i.e., rapid response to "war modes:), especially for HARMs and radar warning receivers. 
Political Strong support throughout. Well-orchestrated coalition to acquire needed authority to use armed force. 
Unspoken objectives politically motivated; minimum US casualties, rapid moving war with clearly visible, continued 
success terminating in unconditional, unambiguous military victory. 
Political objective to "stabilize regional relationship" unclear in pragmatic terms. 
Possible result: reintroduction of armed force to region at later time. 
National interest defined in economic and altruistic terms: "free Kuwait" and "Protect the oil resource" used 
interchangeably. 
IADS have continued to evolve and the SEAD mission has had to evolve in 
response. Brungess (1994) traces this evolution through Vietnam, the Israeli-Syrian 
conflict in the Bekka Valley, Libya, and Desert Storm. The SEAD mission has evolved 
from a piecemeal approach in which specific SAMs are attacked in support of local 
objectives to a full "integration of total-force structures in the achievement of total-force 
objectives. SEAD has started to become JSEAD" (Burgess, p. 42; J - Joint SEAD). 
Table I., adapted from Brungess (1994, p. 43 - 44), gives a summary of key trends 
reflected in the Gulf War. 
The SEAD mission is evolving in response to increasingly sophisticated IADS 
and to take advantage of advanced technologies. However, the evolution is not simply 
being driven by technology, but also by political (e.g., minimize US casualties) and 
economic (e.g., "do more with less") forces. These forces are an important reason why 
the Air Force is currently considering UCAVs as a potential technology to employ as part 
of the SEAD mission. 
LB. UCAV 
Uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) represent a new operational 
concept for the Air Force. Uninhabited aerial vehicles have been used extensively by the 
Israeli Air Force and Pioneer UAVs were employed with great success during the Gulf 
War. The Israeli's used Samson drones to deceive the Syrian radars in the Bekka Valley. 
The Samson can mimic the radar cross section (RCS) of an attacking aircraft. By 
drawing enemy fire the drones created openings for manned aircraft to attack the Syrian 
IADS. The primary missions for the Pioneer during the Gulf War were for 
reconnaissance (including identification of targets and battle damage assessment). The 
idea of using remotely piloted vehicles as a platform for weapons, however, is a new 
operational concept. 
Currently, the Air Force has three UAV Programs — Predator, Global Hawk, and 
Dark Star. Table II lists some general information about each of these platforms and 
Table III provides information about the sensors and communication systems. 
Table II: General Characteristics of UAVs 
Altitude: 
Maximum y 7.6 km, 25,000 ft 19.8 km, 65,000 ft 'A >15.3 km, >50,000 ft 
Operating ;   4.6 km, 15,000 ft 15.2-19.8 km 50,000- 
65,000 ft 
? >153 km, >50,000 ft 
Endurance (max) f   >30hrs >38 hrs >8hrs 
Radius of Action 926 km, 400 nm 5,556 km, 3,000 nm >926 km, >500 nm 
Speed: 
Max : 204-215 km/hr >639 km/hr ( >523 km/hr 
110-115 kts > 345 kts '! >300kts 
Loiter '    120-130 km/hr 639 km/hr ;; >523 km/hr 
;   65-70 kts 345 kts i >300kts 
Cruise 111-120 km/hr 630 km/hr ■   >523 km/hr 
60-65 kts 340 kts \ >300kts 
Climb Rate (max) 168 m/min, 550 fpm 1.036m/min.3.400fpm 610m/min, 2,000 fpm 
Propulsion (engines) 1 Fuel-Inj Rec; 4stro kc     One 'I iirlxifan ^ One Turbofan 
Maker .;.   Rotax 912/Rotax 914 AlUson AE3007H t WUliamsFJ44-lA 
Rating 63.4/75.8kw 85/105h p        32 k"\ 7.050 lb stat Ihr X 8,45 kN 1,900 lb stthr 
Fuel AVGAS (100 Octant )       Heavy Fuel (JP-8) Heavy Fuel (JP-8) 
Capacity 409 L, 108 gal 8,176 L, 2,160 gal t 1,575 L, 416 gal 
Weight: 
Empty ~   544 kg, 1,200 lb 4,055 kg, 8940 lb 1 1,978 kg, 4,360 lb 
Fuel Weight ':''. 285 kg, 650 lb 6,668 kg, 14.700 lb \ 1,470 kg, 3,240 lb 
Payload •/ 204 kg, 450 lb 889 kg, 1,960 lb I 454 kg, 1,000 lb 
Max Takeoff 1, 043 kg, 2,300 lb 11,612 kg. 25,600 lb \ 3,901 kg, 8,600 lb 
Dimensions: 
Wingspan ;;   14.8 m, 48.7 ft 35.4 m, 116.2 ft X 21.0 m, 69 ft 
Length :   8.1m, 26.7 ft 13.5 m, 44.4 ft ;; 4.6 ra, 15 ft 
Height ■:■: 2.2 m, 7.3 ft 4.6 m, 15.2 ft } 1.5 m, 5 ft 
Avionics: 
Transponder t Mode inC IFF Model/II/IUC/TVTFF '- ModelUCIFFF 
Navigation | GPS and INS GPS and INS 2 GPS and INS 
Launch & Recovery f   Runway (2,500 ft) Runway (5,000 ft) I Runway (<4,000 ft) 
Guidance & Control ~A Prepgmd/remote/ 
i~ autonomous 
Pri'pgmd autoniiniiiiis ;: Prepgmd/autonomous 
I.B.1. Predator 
The Predator is currently deployed in Bosnia in support of the Dayton Peace 
Accords. It is a medium altitude endurance (MAE) UAV and is primarily utilized in a 
surveillance role including combat assessment, enemy offensive/defensive position 
monitoring, and camouflage, concealment, and deception identification. Its payload 
includes electro-optical (EO) sensors capable of providing real-time battlefield television 
quality images in daylight fair-weather conditions; infrared (IR) sensors that provide 
real-time monochrome images of emitted heat energy in the mid-infrared band; and 
Tactical Endurance Synthetic Aperture Radar (TESAR) that provides near-real-time 
images of sufficient resolution to detect and recognize equipment types present in the 
scene such as tanks, trucks, or tactical aircraft. The Predator operational concept supports 
dynamic retasking where supported tactical units can request immediate changes in 
coverage area and times to reflect changing intelligence requirements. The Predator's 
deployment package includes three or four air vehicles, a ground control station, a Trojan 
SPIRIT II communications suite, and approximately 55 people. The people include air 
vehicle operators, who are qualified pilots; payload operators, who are qualified imagery 
analysts; and maintenance technicians, and supporting squadron administration 
personnel. 
Table III: Sensors and Communications 
Sensors r« 1 i EO, IR, and SAR EO, IR, and SAR 
Data Links 
Type , C-band/LOS; Ku-band/SATCOM; 
:        MILSATCOM; X-bandCDL/LOS 
f       Ku-band/SATCOM UHF/MILSATCOM 
Bandwidth C-band/LOS: 20 Mhz SATCOM 
>y~! SATCOM UHF: 25 kHz 
''v/'/»; Ku-band: 5Mhz Ku-band: 2.2-72 Mhz 
X-band CDL/LOS: 10- 
120 Mhz 
C-band/LOS: Analog 
Data Rate SATCOM SATCOM 
ÜHF: 4.8 kbps UHF: 19.2 kbps 
Ku-band: 1.544 Mbps Ku-band: 1.5-50 Mbps 
X-band CDL/LOS: 274 
Mbps 







I.B.2. Global Hawk 
The Global Hawk is a conventional high altitude endurance (CONV HAE) UAV. 
This platform is currently in a test stage of development. It is envisioned as a platform 
that will be capable of loitering in an operation area at high altitude (65,000 ft) for 
extended durations (24 hour loiter). It is being designed to be capable of monitoring all 
movements over an entire battle area (40,000 NM2). It will be designed to search large 
areas at high resolution and small areas at very high resolution. It will also be capable of 
providing continual surveillance of small areas. The Global Hawk ground control 
segment includes a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) and a Mission Control Element 
(MCE). The MCE is designed for four operators and its functions include 
communications, command and control, mission planning, and quality control image. 
The LRE is designed for two operators. The Global Hawk allows the mission control 
element to override heading, altitude, and airspeed. The mission control element can 
initiate pre-planned patterns or command specific profiles. The latency in the control 
communication links is on the order of seconds. 
LB.3.  Dark Star 
The Dark Star is a low observable high altitude endurance (LO HAE) UAV. It is 
designed for less capability for surveillance but for higher survivability (i.e., greater 
stealth) than the Global Hawk. Dark Star will soon be back in a test phase of 
development. The first model crashed due to a stall on take-off. The Dark Star is 
designed to utilize the same two-element ground control segment as the Global Hawk. 
The Dark Star will be waypoint driven. That is, there will be no direct control of altitude, 
heading, or airspeed. It will be designed to allow quick selection of alternative takeoff, 
landing, and flight profiles using a mission planner. Both the Dark Star and Global Hawk 
have take-off abort, landing wave-off, and in-flight pre-programmed contingency profiles 
that can be selected from the ground control. 
I.B.4. UCAV. Concept 
The UCAV is currently in the conceptual development phase. None of these 
planes are flying (at least not in unclassified programs). However, numerous major 
defense contractors are working on the concept Sweetman (1997) describes a Lockheed 
Martin concept as "a flying wing, shaped like a diamond when viewed from above; it is 
small enough to be carried to the war zone inside a C-5 or C-17 transport" (p. 99). To 
enhance stealth, this light and efficient vehicle will cruise "into the target area upside 
down, concealing the engine inlet and the landing gear and weapon-bay doors from 
radar" (Sweetman, 1997). 
The Lockheed Martin UCAV will be designed to be controlled from aircraft 
flying safely beyond the enemy ground based integrated air defense systems. Feedback 
to this operator will be provided by surveillance radar and real-time video from the 
UCAV. Because the UCAV is anticipated to be able to approach within 5-miles of 
targets, small weapons with simple guidance systems are being considered. These 
weapons will be low weight and the point-attack warheads will reduce potential risks for 
collateral damage. 
I.C. Cognitive Systems Engineering 





Underspecified refers to the fact that the utilization of UAVs for combat, (i.e., as weapon 
platforms) is a novel use of the technology for which only preliminary, vague concepts of 
operation exist. This represents a unique opportunity for CSE to participate in the design 
of the operational concepts from the ground up; as opposed to being brought in post hoc 
in response to catastrophic failures linked to human error. 
Vulnerable refers to the fact that, because the UCAV technology is novel, there is 
low tolerance for failure. An early catastrophic failure (e.g., fratricide) could scuttle the 
whole concept. If the system is not designed right the first time, there might not be 
another opportunity. Designing the system right will not be possible without a broad 
framework that carefully considers both the functional roles for humans and machines. 
The collaborative and adaptive nature of the UCAV/SEAD mission is what makes 
this an interesting and challenging application for CSE. The next two subsections will 
elaborate on these two dimensions of the problem. 
I.C.l. Collaborative System 
The UCAV is a collaborative system in that it will involve coordination among 
multiple intelligent agents. These agents include both human operators and machine 
agents (e.g., automatic control and other support systems).   The particular configuration 
of operators and automatic control systems is an example of what Sheridan (1997) would 
call a multiple task telerobotics control system. "Multiple" refers to the goal to have a 
single operator control several UAVs (4-6).   "Tele-" refers to the fact that the operator 
will be located in a remote location relative to the workspace. The operator will interact 
with a local computer through displays and controls. The local computer will, in turn, 
communicate with another computer co-located in the remote workspace with the 
"robot." "Robotic" refers to the fact that the controlled process (e.g., UCAV) has its own 
computer and has a capability for autonomous action. 
The remoteness of the operator relative to the battle and the autonomous 
capability of the UCAV are principal challenges relative to effective collaboration (and 
thus unique challenges for design). The remoteness means that the operator is dependent 
on the displays as the primary (if not sole) source of information about system operation. 
What information is necessary, useful, sufficient? How should this information be 
configured so that the operators can quickly and accurately assess the situation and gauge 
the relative appropriateness of response alternatives? 
The autonomous capability of the UCAV raises questions about authority (who's 
in charge?); about responsibility (who does what, when?); about intentionality (why did it 
do that?); and about trust (will it do the right thing?). Advances in technology make 
these questions very difficult to answer. The pat answers that the human is always in 
charge or the allocation of responsibility according to Fitts' (1962) list of what human's 
do better and what machines do better are no longer adequate (Eggleston, 1987; 1988). 
The distinctions between the abilities of humans and of machines get fuzzier every 
minute (Eggleston, 1993). Also, fixed, hierarchical authority structures tend to be brittle 
and prone to coordination failure due to the fact that there is an information gap between 
the sharp end of the system and any centralized authority.   The sharp end of the system 
needs to have more autonomy to deal effectively with dynamically changing workload 
and to fully utilize distributed information (See Rochlin, LaPorte, and Roberts' 1987 
analysis of shifting authority during landing on an aircraft carrier. See also Whitaker & 
Kuperman's 1996 analysis of an attack against time critical targets.) 
The need to reveal the underlying rationality of actions (why did it do that?) and 
to build trust between the human and automated agents places added burden on the 
interface that now must provide information not only about the outcomes of decisions, 
but also about the process rationality driving those outcomes (Eggleston, 1988). Thus, 
the issue becomes how to design the automated components (e.g., automation and 
interfaces) to be effective team players within a distributed collaborative control system 
(e.g., Woods, Johannesen, Cook, & Sarter, 1994). 
I.C.2. Adaptive Systems 
The UCAV is an example of an adaptive system because it needs to function in a 
nondeterministic, dynamically changing environment. Combat is not a static encounter, 
but a dynamic interaction between two competing agents. The environment that exists 
when a mission is planned may be vastly different from the environment at the time of 
mission execution.   Plans must be monitored, updated, revised, and/or discarded in 
response to a dynamically changing context. To gain maximal advantage over the 
enemy, it is important to have the capability to dynamically retask in the light of the latest 
intelligence. 
The need to be adaptive to dynamically changing events is another design 
challenge. The interface must not only provide an effective representation for predictable 
events, but must also help the operator to adapt to unexpected events. How do you 
design for the unexpected? This requires a perspective that considers the widest range of 
possible events. To deal with unexpected events, CSE tends to focus on constraints or 
boundary conditions, rather than on events or activities. The challenge for designing 
adaptive cognitive systems is to effectively leverage the intelligence, intuition, and 
creativity of the human operators to deal with the unpredictability and "normal 
accidents " (Perrow, 1984) that can be expected in complex socio-technical systems. 
I.C.3. UCAV and Cognitive Systems 
Rasmussen's CSE framework is uniquely suited to the collaborative, adaptive 
requirements of the SEAD mission.   Figure I.adapted from Rasmussen illustrates the 
scope of a cognitive task analysis that assesses both operator independent constraints 
inherent in the "situation" and operator (and social context) dependent constraints that 
limit "awareness." A complete cognitive task analysis must consider both situation 
constraints and awareness constraints. However, the situation constraints will take 
precedence in our analyses. This is because the situation constraints are seen as the 
givens for the design problem. In this sense, they represent the problem to be solved. 
The awareness constraints, on the other hand, are far more dependent on design 
decisions. That is, the awareness constraints will be dependent on function allocation and 
interface design. In this sense, the cognitive engineering problem is to shape the 
constraints on awareness (e.g., by design of the automation, the interfaces, and 
allocation of functions) so that they meet the demands created by the situation. The 
human operators are not considered the weak link in the system, but a critical resource for 
designing a stable and reliable distributed, adaptive collaborative control system. The 
challenge is to utilize the adaptive capacity of the human operators as effectively as 
possible. Thus, this report will focus on the demands of the SEAD situation illustrated in 
the top half of Figure I. 
The diagram in Figure I. shows the two sides of the cognitive engineering 
problem. On the one hand, the situation provides the foundation for a normative 
approach to meaning. That is, this half of the cognitive systems equation addresses 
meaning in terms of significant attributes of the workspace in terms of means and ends. 
What are the functional goals and the physical, resource, and control constraints to 
achieving those goals. This side of the equation reflects the demands created by the 
work. It represents the problem space. On the other hand, the awareness side of the 
equation, addresses constraints arising from cognitive or computational processes. Here 
the focus is on organizational and cognitive constraints/resources that are available to 
perceive, interpret, and respond to meaningful properties of problems. Performance 
depends on a good match between situation demands and awareness resources. That, 
again, is the goal of cognitive systems analysis, to uncover mismatches between work 
demands and cognitive resources. Once these mismatches are uncovered the CSE 
problem is to design integrated interfaces, problem solving and collaborative support 
aids, and training protocols that bridge the gap between demands and resources — so that 
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Figure I. This diagram illustrates how multiple perspectives contribute to a complete 
understanding of a work domain in terms of constraints on the work situation and 
constraints on awareness. 
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In characterizing the demands of a workspace, Rasmussen has found it useful to 
orient the analyses with respect to two dimensions: abstraction and level of 
decomposition. Rasmussen (1986) has distinguished five different levels for 
characterizing complex socio-technical systems with respect to the abstraction dimension. 
Brief descriptions are presented here, however, these levels will be more fully explicated 
in later sections of this report: 
Functional Purpose. This level identifies the goals and values of the work domain. 
What is the purpose of the system and what are the figures of merit for gauging the 
success of the system? 
Abstract Function. This level specifies the problem domain in terms of abstract 
dimensions that bridge between the values reflected at the level of functional purpose 
and the physical constraints that bound the flow of activities and the operation of 
technologies to support those goals. 
General Function. This level decomposes the system into processing units with 
identifiable inputs and outputs. Each processing unit is characterized in terms of a 
transfer function that translates inputs to outputs. 
Physical Function. This level identifies the types of technology (e.g., human 
operator, computer, hydraulic or mechanical system, etc.) which is associated with 
each of the functions. 
Physical Form. This level provides a detailed accounting of the space/time 
properties of the system (e.g., where things are located, what's connected to what, 
etc.) and of system performance (e.g., what happens, when). 
Each level of abstraction refers to qualitatively different categories of constraints 
that contribute to the situation. These qualitatively different categories are related in a 
nested hierarchy structure. Categories at higher levels within this hierarchy provide the 
rational context for understanding why lower level constraints are significant. Categories 
at lower levels in the hierarchy provide the physical details of how constraints at higher 
levels can be implemented. The nested hierarchy is typically represented as a triangle 
(Figure II). This graphic reflects the intuition that relatively few categories are needed to 
meaningfully characterize high level constraint of the work domain. However, for lower 
levels many more categories and distinctions are relevant to a meaningful 
characterization. This difference in level of decomposition reflects the second dimension 
of analysis — part-whole decomposition. Together these dimensions can be crossed to 
create a two dimensional space for characterizing the analysis process. As a result of 
work in many different work domains and after analyzing many verbal protocols of 
domain experts, Rasmussen found that experts tend to reason along the diagonal of this 
analysis space. That is, expert reasoning tends to move from global descriptions of 
functional goals to detailed specifications of particular actions on specific components. 
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Figure II. Rasmussen's (1986) abstraction hierarchy represents a nested hierarchy in 
which relatively few categories provide a meaningful characterization of the 
functional purpose of a complex system, but many more categories are needed to 
meaningfully characterize distinctions in physical form. 
Figure II shows how different analyses fit within the abstraction/ decomposition 
space for understanding the problem. Note that these different analyses fall along the 
diagonal of the analysis space and thus are consistent with the pattern seen in expert 
reasoning. Each analysis shown in Figure I. will be considered in turn in the major 
sections of this report. The report will proceed in a top-down fashion from consideration 
of goals and values to analysis of the space-time properties of specific activities. The 
analyses shown represent classical components to any systematic analysis of a complex 
control system. 
A unique attribute of the CSE approach is an attempt to integrate across the 
component analyses to achieve a global understanding of the distributed control system. 
Top down relations along the diagonal help to uncover the underlying rationality of the 
work domain. This rationality provides the reasons why things are done or the reasons 
why things are significant. This is important to understanding the focusing-in problem of 
cognition. That is, what causes certain features to pop out in a way that allows experts to 
focus in on critical aspects of a problem early in the analysis. In other words, what is the 
basis for the high situation awareness achieved by experts. How is it that they can 
recognize good solutions as the first to be considered (e.g., see Klein, 1993)?  Further, 
how can the interfaces be designed to facilitate these recognitional processes and to 
support high levels of situation awareness. 
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Figure III. An illustration of how different aspects of a cognitive task analysis fit 
within the overall analysis space defined by the abstraction and decomposition 
dimensions. Reasoning down the diagonal helps to reveal the rationality that 
determines why things are done. Reasoning up the diagonal helps to reveal the causal 
relations that determine how things are done. 
Bottom up relations along the diagonal help to uncover the causal structure within 
the work domain. This causal structure provides a production like description of how 
things can be accomplished within the work domain. This kind of description is critical 
for the design of rule based, counting-out processes that are typical of classical artificial 
intelligence and expert systems. These relations can be critical in the design of 
automated systems. Automating the well-behaved (rule-based or routine) aspects of the 
work can free up human resources to be focused on supervising the "messier" aspects of 
the work. 
Within the CSE approach the top down and bottom up relations are 
complementary perspectives that contribute to a complete understanding of the 
workspace. A primary goal of the cognitive system engineering approach is to make the 
links along this diagonal explicit (as opposed to an implicit understanding encapsulated 
within a particular analyst's experience). Unlike classical and modern (e.g., optimal) 
approaches to control systems that begin with restrictive assumptions (e.g., linearity, a 
quadratic cost function, etc.) in order to build quantitatively powerful models of the 
system, CSE focuses on the assumptions themselves. Classical and optimal control make 
assumptions that turn messy problems into well-defined problems that allow quantitative 
solutions. But CSE is all about the "messiness," because that is why operators are 
included in most control systems — to deal with the messiness (the unanticipated 
variability). If the problems were well defined and met the limiting assumptions of 
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classical or modern control models, then there would be no need for the human. The goal 
of cognitive engineering is to understand the messiness as the most interesting part of the 
problem.   As a result, the models of CSE tend to rely more on the qualitative insights of 
control theory, rather than on the quantitative methods. This does not mean that 
quantitative models are not used or that they are not valuable tools for developing 
qualitative insights. But the quantitative models are not sufficient. In many respects, 
CSE is most important for exploring regions just outside the limits of a quantitative 
control analyses of the problem. These are the regions where automated solutions are 
likely to breakdown. These are the regions where human expertise is an essential 
ingredient for success. In this respect, CSE is a means of providing a qualitative glimpse 
over the horizon set by limits of our quantitative control models. 
From a design perspective, CSE generally focuses on the nature of problem 
representations as a means for dealing with messy problems. Through the design of 
interfaces, CSE attempts to build representations that allows operators to directly 
perceive significant features of a problem (e.g., see Bennett, Nagy, & Flach, 1997; Flach 
& Bennett, 1996; Rasmussen & Vicente, 1989; Vicente, 1992; Woods, 1991). 
Rasmussen (1998) emphasizes that in building these representations, designers must look 
beyond the human-computer interface "to the interface between a decision maker and the 
deep relational structure of the work space." He presents a thorough review of ecological 
interface design in the context of SEAD/UAV systems. Through the design of training 
systems and protocols, CSE, helps to attune internal representations (in Rasmussen's 
(1986) terms, the dynamic internal model), to significant features of the problem (e.g., 
Flach, Lintern, & Larish, 1995; Flach, 1997). It is too early in the analysis process to 
speculate about interfaces or training programs for UCAVs. However, a long range goal 
for the analysis reported here is to ultimately inform decisions about interface and 
training program design. 
In sum, the UCAV design problem can be characterized as a "messy" problem. 
The operational concepts are Underspecified. The work domain of the SEAD mission 
requires a Collaborative and Adaptive human-machine system. Finally, this is a 
Vulnerable mission and technology. The mission is dangerous and the technology is 
relatively untested. The remainder of this report will work down the diagonal of Figure 
1.3 as a preliminary step to a more complete CSE analysis. 
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H. MISSION OBJECTIVES AND VALUES 
This section considers the highest level of abstraction—the level of functional 
purpose. At this level, the fundamental question is—why does this system exist? The 
functional goals define the problem space in terms of a value system. This level 
represents critical dimensions for evaluating the "optimality" or "degree of satisfaction" 
associated with outcomes and thus provides the ultimate context for evaluating "success'1 
or "failure." This is the level at which the "cost functional" relative to optimal control 
models might be considered. 
Aerospace Power 
Force Bihancement Force Support 
Aerospace Control Force Application 
Defensive Offensive 
Attacks on enemy 
warning and control 
systems 
Attacks on enemy 
suface-based 
aerospace defenses 
Attacks on enemy 
bases and launch 
facilities 
Figure IV. Decomposition of the general function of Aerospace Power. In this 
context the SEAD mission is an important subfunction of the general function of 
aerospace control. 
At this level it is important to consider the UCAV/SEAD in the context of the 
global objective of the Air Force and in the context of general principles of war. Figure 
IV. shows the SEAD mission in the context of the more global function of Aerospace 
Power. Basic Aerospace Doctrine (Air Force Manual 1-1,1992) breaks the general 
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function of aerospace power into four sub-functions. Of these subfunctions, the function 
of aerospace control plays a prominent role—"aerospace control should be the first 
priority of aerospace forces" (Air Force Manual 1-1,1992, p. 10). This function can be 
further decomposed into two subfunctions: offensive counteraerospace and defensive 
counteraerospace. In turn, offensive counteraerospace can be decomposed in terms of the 
target objectives: warning and control centers, surface based defenses, or enemy bases 
and launch facilities. In current discussions, all three target objectives are included 
within the SEAD mission. For example Air Force Manual 1-1 (1997) writes, "OCA 
operations include the suppression of enemy air defense defense targets, such as aircraft 
and surface-to-air missiles or local defense systems, and their supporting C2."  Localized 
SEAD generally refers to missions that target surface based defenses. 
SEAD is defined as "any activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily  . 
degrades enemy surface based air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means" (Joint 
Pub 3-01.4,1995). The definition makes the "objective" of the SEAD mission clear, but 
does not explicate the value system that might be used to compare alternative means for 
achieving that objective. If you wanted to compare two alternative designs for a UCAV, 
what attributes would be important to consider? To begin to address this question, we 
consider basic aerospace doctrine (Air Force Manual 1-1,1992) which outlines nine 
principles of war: 
Objective. Direct military operations toward a defined and attainable objective that 
contributes to strategic, operational, or tactical aims. 
Offensive. Act rather than react and dictate the time, place, purpose, scope, intensity, 
and pace of operations. The initiative must be seized, retained, and fully exploited. 
Mass. Concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place. 
Economy of Force. Create usable mass by using minimum combat power on 
secondary objectives. Make the fullest use of all forces available. 
Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible 
application of combat power. 
Unity of Command. Ensure unity of effort for every objective under one responsible 
commander. 
Security. Protect friendly forces and their operations from enemy actions that could 
provide the enemy with unexpected advantage. 
Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is 
unprepared. 
Simplicity. Avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing, planning, and conducting 
military operations. (Air Force Manual 1-1,1992, Fig 1-1, p. 1) 
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Figure V shows one possible hierarchy for these nine principles. This hierarchical 
structure does not represent differences in priority. Rather, the hierarchy highlights 
functional interdependencies among the nine principles. These interdependences may be 
critical for evaluating trade-off across competing goals. 
The definition of SEAD above specifies the "objective" for the SEAD mission, 
which is the top node of the hierarchy. At this level, performance might be scored 
relative to the number of ground threats destroyed or disabled; in terms of the space and 
time over which the threats are suppressed; and/or in terms of the probability of survival. 
This level of description could provide a good measure of operational effectiveness for an 
actual SEAD mission, but it is difficult to score a "design" in these terms. One can only 
guess about whether a particular design innovation will significantly impact the 
destructive effectiveness or survivability of the system. Guesses may be informed by 
man-in-the-loop simulations and/or quantitative system models, but they are guesses, 
never-the-less that reflect the simulation or model designer's assumptions about what is 
valuable and about the nature of potential threats. However, because IADS are also 
evolving it is difficult to reliably extrapolate into the future.   (SEAD enables airspace 
control—a higher level objective.) 
Objective 
Surprise Maneuver Mass Unity of Ccmmand Economy of Force 
Figure V. A hierarchical representation of the nine principles of war. The 
dimensions at the base of the hierarchy will be used as dimensions of a value space for 
evaluating potential "means" for accomplishing the SEAD objective. 
The next level, specifies some general values for evaluating alternative means for 
achieving a military objective (proactive, safe, and simple). The value of these dimensions 
is clear, but it is not clear how these abstract objectives could be measured. How do you 
quantify proactive, safe, or simple —particularly when you are evaluating a design? The 
next lowest level provides more specific attributes for evaluating potential means. At this 
level, the values are stated in terms that might be measured and evaluated even in the 
design phase. Thus, UAVs described in Tables I. and 1.2 can be compared in terms 
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of their stealth capabilities (surprise), their maneuverability, their fire power capability 
(mass), their command and control structure (unity of command), and their design and 
operation costs (economy of force). This lower level of the hierarchy may be particularly 
important for measurement and for meaningfully evaluating alternate means for 
achieving the ends of "neutralizing, destroying, or temporarily degrading enemy surface 
based air defenses." 
The hierarchy in Figure V suggests how objective measures of the lower level 
goals might be integrated to make inferences about the higher level principles—and 
ultimately about success with respect to the specific objective to suppress enemy air 
defenses. This integration is critical for evaluating design trade-offs among the 
competing goals. For example, the decision to shift from the F4-G to the Block 50 F 16s 
for manned SEAD missions is largely motivated by desires for simplicity and economy 
of forces. However, savings on these dimensions must be weighed against potential costs 
in offensive power—the ability to maneuver and mass the right forces to attack a SAM 
site. Concerns have been raised that the F-16's sensor capabilities (even with LANTIRN) 
are not as effective as the F4's and that the single F-16 pilot will not have the same 
capacity to manage the complex information as the 2-man crew of the F4. For example, 
North (1997) writes: 
The single most limiting operating consideration for the HTSpod is that it has afield- 
of-view of 87 deg. either side of the F-16 nose. This is different than the 360-deg. 
coverage provided by the F-4G Wild Weasel. The Air Force has no plans at present 
to give the F-16 full 360-deg. coverage. The other limitation cited by some is the use 
of the F-16 for the HARM role is that the F-16 is a single-seat fighter, while the F-4 
is a two seater. Another difference between the systems is that the F-16's HTSpod 
does not give an audio identification of the radar emission threat, [p. 153]  Newer 
versions of F-16 (e.g., block 50) however, may mitigate these concerns.. 
One way in which this kind of information is typically presented is in trade-off 
curves. How much is a specific increase in mass (e.g., weapons load) worth, in terms of 
costs to the ability to surprise (e.g., RCS)? In many cases, the level of quantification 
required to generate trade-off curves will not be available. However, the importance of a 
qualitative understanding should not be underestimated—this might be achieved by 
documenting consistencies and inconsistencies in information provided by subject matter 
experts (SMEs) about critical incidents or decisions that reflect these trade-offs. Thus, 
another form of data may be "cases" or "stories" that illustrate the underlying value 
system guiding choices and actions. 
Brungess (1994) suggests four continuums that reflect the changes in the value 
system for evaluating the SEAD mission: 
Piecemeal/integrated dimension. This dimension considers the degree to which the 
SEAD mission is integrated within a global mission to disable the IADS. Defensive 
SEAD (e.g., as practiced in Vietnam) tends to be a piecemeal, reactive response to 
localized threats. On the other hand, offensive SEAD (e.g., Desert Storm) tends to be a 
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more integrated approach where SEAD is part of a joint services mission directed at 
global objectives to disable the total IADS structure. The trend is toward integrated 
approaches. In terms of Air Force Doctrine this continuum reflects movement toward a 
proactive attitude with increased unity of command. It also has implications for the 
economy of effort. 
Need-based/resource-based dimension. This dimension considers the support available 
for SEAD missions. At the need-based end of this continuum the need takes precedence. 
This reflects a resource rich environment where political support of military objectives is 
a high priority. The resource-based end of the continuum reflects an environment where 
political support for military objectives is low. That is, the key consideration is how to 
most effectively utilize limited resources in order to achieve mission objectives. The 
current environment is closer to the resource-based end of this continuum, where the 
military is increasingly challenged to "do more with less." This obviously relates to 
economy of force. 
Threat-based/Capability-based dimension. This dimension considers the degree to 
which strategies and tactics can be targeted to characteristics of a specific threat. For 
example, Cold War military tactics were largely tailored toward a specific enemy (the 
Soviet Union). However, now the "US SEAD community faces an unknown potential 
enemy that can field the best weapons Western arms industries are capable of selling 
them" (Brungess, 1994, p. 85). In a threat-based situation, it is much easier to define 
objective criteria for evaluation. However, the trend is toward more capability-based 
situations. As Brungess (1994) notes, this promises "to be vexatious." How do you 
evaluate "general capability" with respect to ill-defined threats? This dimension reflects 
constraints on how objective strategies and tactics can be. 
Defensive/Offensive dimension. This dimension considers the degree to which SEAD 
serves in a defensive support role or as an offensive weapon. The trend appears to be 
toward increasing use of SEAD as an offensive weapon for attacking IADS. 
These four dimensions of Brungess (1994) illustrate how political, economic, and 
technological forces have an impact on the tradeoffs among dimensions in the value 
space. Because of economic pressures and due to the lack of a single, well-defined 
enemy the SEAD of the future will need to be more fully integrated into an offensive, 
capability based strategy that efficiently utilizes limited resources. How do UCAVs meet 
these requirements? 
To conclude our preliminary analysis of the mission goals and values, it is useful 
to again consider the general framework shown in Figure 1.1. On the situation side of the 
equation, this level of analysis emphasizes the "ends" for the means-ends structure (1). 
These "ends" provide an important context for parsing the work domain in terms of tasks 
(2). These ends also represent key components to a "cost functional" for evaluating 
decisions (3) and strategies (4). On the awareness side of the equation, the values, such 
as the principles of war, are important aspects of the organization culture (6). The goal 
structure can also have important implications for team structure and role allocation (5). 
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m. AFFORDANCES & RESOURCES 
This level introduces an abstract description that makes it possible to bound the 
space of possible or feasible design solutions. The term "affordance" was coined by 
Gibson (1979) to characterize the opportunities that the natural environment offers (or 
affords) an animal. Norman (1988) and others have extended application of this term as a 
key concept for characterizing the opportunities which are afforded by technologies as 
well as natural environments. At this level, consideration is given to the limiting 
technologies and resources for implementing the SEAD mission. What can UCAVs do? 
The objective, at this level, is to choose a language for characterizing the problem space 
that bridges between the functional goals and the physical constraints that bound 
approaches to those goals. For example, the flow of electromagnetic energy is critical to 
"surprise," and to identifying the location of targets so that weapons can be 
"maneuvered" and "massed" to the appropriate place at the right time. The flow of 
weapons and aircraft require that the "affordance space" include dimensions that reflect 
aerodynamic constraints on motion. At this level, aerodynamic constraints of particular 
aircraft are not considered, rather the general parameters of any aerodynamic system are 
considered as dimensions of the overall problem space. 
A significant technology for the SEAD mission is the technology of 
electromagnetic or electronic warfare. Electronic warfare evolved during World War II 
in what Churchill called the "battle of the beams" or the "wizard war." This battle 
involved the development of electronic guidance aides by the Germans and counter- 
measures taken by the allies (Fitts, 1980). The use of electronic warfare related to the 
SEAD mission was further developed in response to the SAM missile threat during the 
Vietnam War. 
Fitts (1980) defines electronic warfare as: 
military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, 
reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which 
retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum (p. 1). 
Electromagnetic energy includes radio, radar, infrared, optical systems, and lasers. Fitts 
(1980, p. 2) specifies three divisions of electronic warfare which are shown in Table IV. 
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Table IV. 
Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) - involves "actions taken to search for, 
intercept, locate, record, and analyze radiated electromagnetic energy, for the purpose of 
exploiting such radiation in support of military operations" (p. 1). *  
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) - involves "actions taken to prevent or reduce 
the enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum" (Fitts, p. 2). It includes: 
Jamming - "the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic 
energy with the object of impairing the use of electronic devices, equipment, or 
systems being used by the enemy" (Fitts, p. 2). 
Deception - "the deliberate radiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of 
electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to mislead the enemy in the 
interpretation or use of information received by his electronic systems. There are 
two categories of deception. 
(1) Manipulative - the alteration or simulation of friendly electronic radiations 
to     accomplish deception. 
(2) Imitative - introducing radiation into enemy channels which imitates his own 
 emissions" (Fitts, p. 2).  
Electronic Counter-countermeasures (ECCM) - involves "actions taken to insure 
friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of EW" 
(Fitts, p. 2).  
At this level of analysis it is important to understand the fundamental principles of 
electromagnetic energy and how these principles constrain sensor, display, and weapon 
technologies. Table V. below (from Fitts, 1980) shows a somewhat dated list of how 
parts of the electromagnetic spectrum are utilized for some typical location systems. 
Although dated, this list helps to convey a sense of how the spectrum is typically used. 
One of the goals for this level of analysis is to give an abstract characterization that 
suggests measures that will help to connect decision about function allocation and the 
design of the physical system (lower levels of abstraction) with the functional goals at the 
highest level of abstraction. As noted by Brungess (1994) this can be a problem: 
Since the electromagnetic spectrum is the medium with which modern defense 
suppression works, the criterion of counting bomb craters, measuring distances 
from intended impact point, or assessing hits per try is more difficult to apply. 
Wave fronts of electromagnetic radiation are invisible: the theory of their 
propagation is not easy to explain — nor is it easy to counter an adversary's use 
of the spectrum. . . Many tactics and strategy analysts try to place SEAD effects 
in the realm of the observable without clear references to the overall objective 
SEAD supports (p. 52) 
* Note: Electronic Warfare Nomenclature continues to change. Currently the 
terms electronic protection and electronic attack are favored over the older ESM, 
ECM terms used in Fitts, 1980. 
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Table V. Spectrum Utilization of Typical Military Location Systems 
(from Fitts, 1980) 
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The capabilities of electromagnetic sensors are one set of design constraints. However, 
there are many other sources of constraint that bound the design space for UCAVs with 
respect to the SEAD mission. Table HI. 3 presents brief descriptions of some of the 
general categories of constraints that might be considered in an analysis of affordances 
and resources for the SEAD mission. 
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Table VI. 
Aerodynamics - at this level the laws of aerodynamics set critical boundaries for how 
high, far, fast, etc. a platform can fly and for the consequences of those actions (e.g., g- 
forces, energy cost, etc.). Some of the aerodynamic constraints (e.g., maximum speed 
and climb rate) of UAV platforms are listed in Table 1.1.  
Sensor Technology - at this level focus is primarily on the electromagnetic spectrum and 
the technologies for sensing electromagnetic energy (e.g., radar, infrared and optical 
systems). Table 1.2 lists some of the sensors that will be utilized on various UAV 
platforms. What are the functional relations or laws that constrain range, resolution, field 
of view, etc.? How does this electromagnetic energy map on to the objects of interest? 
Interface Technology - this level focuses on the properties of controls and displays. 
What are the constraints on the representations that can be constructed at the human- 
machine interface? Fundamental constraints on resolution, gain, field-of-regard, level of 
detail, etc. are considered at this level.  
Weapons Technology - this level considers fundamental constraints on weapons 
systems. Issues include size, accuracy, launch constraints, destructive capacity, guidance 
systems, etc.  
Communication & Control - this level considers constraints on communications 
systems and their implications for stability and control. Table 1.2 lists some of the 
communication technologies that will be utilized in various UAV platforms. Signal-to- 
noise and time delays are particularly important considerations here. Time delay for 
Dark Star and Global Hawk are in the range of seconds.  
Information Processing - this level considers the computational capacity of the system 
(the capacity to differentiate and integrate information). Issues such as information 
processing rate and memory capacity (both working and long-term memory) are 
considered here. Important issues here are the constraints that determine "bottlenecks" or 
"chokepoints" in the flow of information. Both automatic and human information 
processing is considered here.  
Rules of Engagement - the rules and conventions of war are considered at this level. 
Considerations at this level include international law and national policy as well as 
military doctrine.  
Each category in Table VI. represents a different basic scientific discipline. It is clear 
that design of complex systems like a UCAV system is a multidisciplinary endeavor. 
Coordination across the various disciplines can be critical to successful design. 
Cognitive systems engineers can not be expected to know all the critical information 
across these disciplines, but cognitive engineering can help to facilitate interactions 
across the various disciplines. One way to do this is to make the relations between the 
mission objectives/values and technological constraints as explicit as possible. Thus, the 
mission goals provide a common currency to promote dialog across the various 
disciplines. Explicating the relations between technological constraints and mission goals 
can help to organize these basic scientific data in such a way that those outside the 
specific disciplines can appreciate the significance of the scientific laws and principles 







Figure VI. A state diagram provides a representation to conceptual bridge between 
the "physical law based" constraints (e.g., aerodynamic constraints) and "value 
based" constraints (e.g., the goals of maneuvering mass in a way that will surprise the 
enemy). The abstract function level of analysis attempts to identify the dimensions of 
this state space. The boundaries within the space reflect higher order goal (e.g., 
avoiding detection) and lower lever physical constraints (e.g., stall boundary). 
One kind of representation that can be very effective for representing the interaction of 
"physical law based" (affordances) and "value based" (mission objectives) constraints is 
the state space diagram (Figure VI.). The dimensions of the state space diagram are 
variables that reflect the underlying physical dynamics. The boundaries within the state 
space can reflect either law based physical constraints (e.g., the stall margin) or value 
based constraints (e.g., boundary defined by probability of detection by enemy radar). 
Integrating these constraints into a common graphical space helps to visualize the 
"possibilities for action," "affordances," or the potential "safe" regions of operation 
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as illustrated in Figure VI. Kirlik (1995) provides a good illustration of how visualizing 
the values and physical constraints can provide a basis for predicting expert behavior in a 
complex synthetic task for helicopter crews. 
The key considerations at this level are not the particulars of a specific constraint 
such as the stall boundary illustrated in Figure VI., because this reflects details of the 
physical form of the aircraft (e.g., wing shape). Rather, the level of abstract function 
specifies the dimensions of a problem space representation which reflects both the 
constraints of the physical systems and technologies (which will be considered in detail at 
lower levels of analysis) and the values and goals (which were discussed in the previous 
section). The value of the abstract function level is to bridge between the top-down 
rationale constraints reflected in the goals and purposes of the system and the bottom-up 
causal constraints that arise from the particular physical instantiations of the system. 
Thus, the point is that if your goal is to fly weapons and sensors into a battle, then speed 
and altitude will be critical dimensions that need to be considered as part of the overall 
problem space. 
There is an interesting discussion in the SAB report on UAVs (SAB-TR-96-01) of 
how the maximum altitude for the UAV (which reflects fundamental law based 
constraints on line-of-sight communications) interacts with vulnerability to potential 
threats: 
Altitude - Sensor and communication link line-of-sight reach is the primary driver, 
with survivability second. An altitude of 65,000 ft offers over 300 nm to the radio 
horizon (disregarding multipath difficulties) and over 100 nm for 5 degree grazing 
angle SAR (synthetic aperture radar) or MTI (moving target indicator). Flying at 
altitudes above 5,000 ft defeats most radar directed guns and above 15,000 ft defeats 
most shoulder launched homing weapons. Altitudes greater than 60,000 ft defeat the 
bulk of older SAMs and above 70,000 ft prevent fighters from reaching co-altitude. 
However, even at 70,000 ft air-to-air missiles can be launched to higher altitudes. 
(Worch, et al., 1996, p. 4-1) 
The SAB also discusses how endurance (determined largely by aerodynamic 
constraints) reflects on the value system in terms of economy of force: 
Endurance - the value of endurance is primarily in the economics of fleet size 
necessary to maintain one vehicle continually on station and secondarily in the 
flexibility of basing far from the theater of action. On-station to transit-time ratios of 
less than 1:1 require more than two vehicles (plus backup) to maintain one on station. 
An operating radius of 6,000 nm to station allows CONUS (Continental US) basing to 
cover most of the world. A nominal 3,000 nm radius allows nearly world coverage 
from four politically secure bases (Roosevelt Roads, Mildenhall, Diego Garcia, 
Guam). A 1,000 nm radius is sufficient for most in theater sanctuary operations. 
(Worch, et al., 1996, p. 4.2) 
These two samples from the SAB report are representative of how physical 
constraints and values interact in evaluating design solutions. The relations between 
functional objectives and technological limitations are critical considerations for design. 
These dimensions specify the design problem space. This space provides an important 
framework for discussions between the Air Force Command (who specify what is 
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desirable, in terms of performance objectives and cost) and the technical engineering 
community (who are most knowledgeable about the technological means for 
accomplishing the performance objectives). Again, this level of analysis provides a 
framework for integrating over the intentional and physical constraints to identify 
satisfactory solutions. Cognitive engineers are typically the experts on the human 
information processing component. However, they can also play an important role in 
managing the cross disciplinary market place where many disciplines contribute to a 
complete understanding of the problem. 
In terms of Figure I., consideration of the affordance and resource constraints sets 
the ultimate boundary conditions for "means" to achieving the systems "ends" (1). The 
affordances and resource constraints set feasibility boundaries and help to dimension the 
trade-off curves for evaluating the criticality of tasks (2) and the optimality of decisions 
(3) and strategies (4). One would expect that skilled operators would have an implicit 
understanding of the affordance and resource constraints that govern performance in a 
work domain and that this understanding would be reflected in their decision making and 
their choice of strategies. 
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VII. FUNCTIONAL FLOW 
This level of analysis decomposes the SEAD mission into functional processing 
blocks or stages. At this level of abstraction it is desirable to have a level of 
decomposition that allows clear specification of the inputs, outputs, and goals for each 
process. However, the descriptions should be general enough to cover a wide range of 
specific design options. That is, the decomposition should not be specific to a particular 
design (e.g., UAV versus manned). Thus, the functional flow at this level does not reflect 
any particular function allocation. The components represent processing requirements, 
with no commitment to whom (which crew member) or what (automated system) will 






























Figure VII. A decomposition of the SEAD mission into subfunctions within an overall functional 
flow. 
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The lower flow graph in Figure VII. represents a first hypothesis about an 
appropriate decomposition for this level of analysis. Each of the subfunctions in this 
graph will be considered in turn. 
ELINT - specific agencies within the military are tasked with the mission of 
collecting intelligence. Intelligence gathering is an ongoing operation. Intelligence 
provided by these agencies undergoes extensive analysis and represents a time frame 
greater than 24 hours prior to takeoff. This intelligence not only contributes information 
used in planning a specific SEAD mission, but also contributes to long range 
development of technologies and tactics. 
Fitts (1980) describes the nature of intelligence with regard to electronic warfare: 
The foundation of the whole subject of electronic warfare rests upon well-developed 
knowledge of the enemy electronic systems. This is the proper function of 
intelligence. It requires a long term effort and it culminates in the specification of the 
capabilities of the enemy weapon systems (Scientific and Technical Intelligence), the 
disposition of the enemy weapons (specifically the Electronic Order of Battle), and 
the strategy the enemy will use in the employment of his weapons (his battle tactics). 
This information is necessary to develop effective weapons and tactics, and to target 
our weapons to obtain our objectives.  Thus intelligence, or the lack of it, forms the 
backdrop for the combat that is electronic warfare (p. 36). 
Input from the ELINT component provides the background for mission planning. 
Input to the ELINT component comes from a variety of sources. The ELINT component 
links the SEAD mission to higher level control loops that reflect the larger historical 
context of the mission and the larger goals of the Joint Forces Command with respect to 
air superiority. 
Table VII. outlines three stages of ELINT to determine the "fingerprint" of an 
electromagnetic transmitting site (Fitts, 1980). 
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) - this component represents an additional source 
of reconnaissance that provides inputs to the planning function. Fitts (1980) contrasts 
ESM with ELINT: 
When the tactical commander comes to the point of planning tomorrow's mission ...he 
needs more than this extensive background information [ELINT]; he also needs to know 
the precise state of the enemy's electronic defenses. It is not enough to know that there 
are so many AAA sites and SAM sites in the defense, he wants to know precisely where 
they are located, whether any have moved since the previous day, and if any new ones 
have appeared. He is also vitally interested in their tactics, e.g., if they have tried new 
approaches to defense.  The value of the information to him is directly proportional to its 
currency. Hence, he has a legitimate need to request that certain reconnaissance be 
performed to satisfy his immediate needs.  This reconnaissance is ESM because it will be 
quickly processed in response to the tactical commander's needs. The sources of ESM 
may be diverse; it may come from a regularly scheduled collection mission, or it may 
come from the debriefing of aircrews returning from the previous mission. In any case it 
will be subject to a minimum of formal analysis because of time constraints (p. 37). 
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Table VII. 
Raw Data Collection - the information which a receiver can determine from a signal 
are: 
a. Receiver power - which depends on the distance and orientation from the 
transmitter. 
b. Signal spectrum. 
c. Signal envelop 
d. Time variation - these are the gross variations due to antenna scan or transmitters 
being turned off 
e. Signal polarization - the orientation of the electric field in the signal 
f. Direction of the transmitter from the receiver.  
Analysis - the components of the fingerprint which the collector would like to 
determine are: 
a. Transmitter power (must know distance from the transmitter to receiver) 
b. Carrier frequency (usually can be derived from the spectrum) 
c. Modulation (can be determined from spectrum and the envelop of the signal) 
d. Antenna Pattern (requires analysis of the time variation of the received signal 
at a moving collection point) 
e. Antenna scan (if the antenna moves in a consistent fashion, such as radar 
antenna, then the antenna scan may be determined from the time variation of the 
signal. 
f. Transmitter location (range and bearing)  
Collation - the ultimate goal of electronic reconnaissance is to determine the following: 
a. Equipment characteristics (scientific and technical intel) 
1. Transmitter power 
2. Antenna Type 
3. Frequency 
4. Modulation 
5. Special characteristics 
b. Geographical location (order of battle) 
c. Operational procedures (operational intelligence) 
d. Equipment use and capability (the threat) 
e. Messages transmitted (COMINT)  
Planning. Planning is critical to the success of any complex mission. Key 
considerations for SEAD mission include information about the location and emitter 
characteristics of potential targets. As North (1997) notes the HARM Targeting System 
(HTS) "only looks for what it has been programmed to see. The sequence of emitters to 
be picked up — based on their capabilities, performance and operations — can be 
preprogrammed into the cassette, which is inserted in the front cockpit" (p. 151). SEAD 
missions are typically flown with four F-16s who fly a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) orbit. 
This CAP orbit would typically be a figure eight or bow tie type orbit with the horizontal 
axis aligned in a way to allow the HTS to scan the locations of the highest priority 
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emitters. This type of orbit insures that the target area is in view of at least one of the 
HTS pods at all times. The SEAD mission must be planned in coordination with other 
functions in the joint area of operations. Joint Pub 3-01.4 outlines important planning 
considerations for the Joint Suppression of Enemy Defenses (J-SEAD). 
Navigation. The navigation function is directed at getting the sensors and 
weapons to the right place at the right time. The function has typically depended on 
charts and visual, magnetic, and inertial references. However, the availability of the 
global positioning system (GPS) allows precise information about position and velocity. 
The availability of GPS can greatly increase the precision of navigation and it eliminates 
the need for many of the computations that were required before the availability of the 
Navistar satellites. However, methods for jamming GPS are already being developed. 
Thus, a system that depends on GPS for navigation may be vulnerable in the future. 
Flight Control. In addition to normal precision requirements involved in flying 
the CAP orbit in coordination with other aircraft, the pilot must be able to orient the plane 
for optimal weapons release and must be prepared to maneuver to evade SAMs. Trussel 
(1997) writes "generally the best way to defeat a SAM is to fly away from it as soon as 
possible. This extends the distance the SAM has to fly causing it to run out of fuel before 
it gets to you. If the launch is very close or you can't turn away soon enough you could 
try the last ditch maneuvers. The maneuvers varied based on the type of SAM coming to 
kill you but they were all hit-and-miss (pun) at best" (p. 6). 
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) - this function involves the use of 
penetration aids (penaids) that allow a force to reduce the risks associated with 
penetrating a hostile defense. The majority of penaids are directed against radar, since 
these are often the eyes of the enemy. There are two general classes of ECM — Jamming 
and Deception.   Another facet of ECM is RHAW (radar homing and warning). Fitts 
(1980) notes that "the easiest RHAW task is to alert the crew members that signals are 
present; but that is only useful in sparse signal environments, in a dense environment 
such a warning is trivia....The most difficult RHAW task is to determine the direction of 
the threat, since this implies multiple antennas to achieve directivity or an analysis 
capability over a period of time" (p. 74). 
Command & Control The command and control function is the heart of the 
control system. This function closes loops at multiple levels. The command and control 
function links the inner loops that control activities to the outer loops that relate the 
activities to the planned mission goals. It also coordinates the activities of multiple 
components involved in a SEAD mission. The SEAD mission typically involves 
multiple aircraft. Classically, a SEAD mission may have involved a hunter (F4) - killer 
(F15) team, several stand-off jammers (e.g., Compass Call or Rivet Joint), and the attack 
force that the SEAD mission is supporting. Current tactics using F15s or F16s typically 
employ four aircraft that fly a coordinated pattern to ensure that the target space is always 
illuminated by at least one of the forward looking HARM targeting systems. 
Weapons Operation The current weapon of choice for the SEAD mission is the 
High-Speed Anti-Radar Missile (HARM). HARMs can home in on radar emissions and 
track back to destroy the source (antenna) of those emissions. This effectively blinds the 
SAM site, but depending on the position of the antenna to the launch facility may do little 
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or no damage to the missile launch facility. Thus, a SAM site may only be temporarily 
disabled as a consequence of a HARM hit. A destroyed antenna can be replaced in a 
matter of hours. The HARM range is greater than 70 nautical miles. It is estimated that 
the missile will travel the first 10 nm in 30 s and the next 10 nm in 1 min. According to 
Shaw (1997) "there is a block upgrade program under consideration that would add an 
inertial measurement unit and a Global Positioning Unit receiver to the HARM for point- 
to-point targeting" (p. 153). If the HARM can not find an appropriate target, it will 
destroy itself. 
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Battle damage assessment closes the loop 
between command and control and weapons operation. Real time assessment of the 
damage inflicted by weapons is critical for assessing the next move within the SEAD 
engagement. What targets have been eliminated? What targets remain? Where should 
the next HARM be directed? The BDA function also provides information for ESM 
relative to near term missions and for longer term mission planning. It is important that 
the BDA be framed within the context of the IADS. That is, a simple count of percent 
targets hit is not the issue. The question is what is the current state of the IADS? What 
level of damage has been inflicted and what capabilities remain? 
Summary At the function flow level of description the system is described as a 
nested set of control loops.   This helps to specify the task situation (2) and the decision 
tasks (3) with respect to Rasmussen's analysis framework (Figure 1.1). The functional 
flow decomposition can help in visualizing the flow of information and the logical 
coupling between information and action and the couplings among decisions and actions 
across different levels of the nested control system.   These couplings may have 
important implications for what strategies (4) might be successful in terms of a stable 
control system. 
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V. FUNCTION ALLOCATION 
At this level, consideration is given to allocation of functions within the human- 
machine system. In principle, functions should be allocated with consideration to: 
1) constraints on the functions themselves, 
2) the capabilities of the potential agents (both human and automated), 
and 
3) the overall structure of the team. 
These considerations are outlined in Table V.l. The goal would be to allocate functions 
in a way that would lead to a high probability of satisfying mission goals and that would 
efficiently utilize the available resources. This is a particularly difficult and challenging 
design issue for a collaborative, adaptive system, because the criteria listed in Table V.l 
can change dynamically with shifting contexts. For this reason, satisfactory function 
allocation can not be done a priori, since no fixed allocation will be optimal (or even 
satisfactory) across all the changing demands created by the dynamic context of the 
SEAD mission. The system must be designed so that responsibilities and roles can 
smoothly shift to reflect changes in, for example, the situation awareness and workload of 
the various cognitive agents. The problem of coordinating among multiple cognitive 
agents [including multiple human operators (e.g., pilot and electronic weapons officer) 
and multiple automated systems (e.g., UAVs, automated planning and decision systems)] 
is a critical challenge for designing a UCAV system for the SEAD mission. 
The introduction of the UCAV as a new technology for the SEAD mission raises 
important concerns about the allocation of function. How much can we expect this new 
technology to do? How does the integration of this new technology change the roles of 
the other components (team members) in the collaborative system. There have been 
projections that a single human operator may have responsibility for multiple (4 to 6) 
UCAVs. Is this realistic? 
A first step, in considering function allocation is to examine existing systems. 
There are two directions that might be taken here. One is to consider current systems for 
accomplishing the SEAD mission. These are currently manned systems. The other 
direction is to consider current UAV systems, which are primarily used for 
reconnaissance and surveillance.  In this report, emphasis will be on the SEAD mission. 
However, a more complete analysis should also consider how the constraints that are 
inherent in the UAV technologies impact the role of operators. Most significant among 
these constraints is the long time delays between command centers and the UAV 
platforms. Note that for systems such as Global Hawk and Dark Star the time delay is on 
the order of seconds. This makes direct control of flight very difficult. As a result, the 
human operator is more likely to function as a supervisory controller (assigning 
waypoints and/or choosing among preprogrammed flight protocols), rather than as a 
manual controller (directly controlling flight surfaces). 
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Table VIII. 




Priority. Relative importance or criticality of a particular 
function. Is it essential or discretionary with respect to the overall 
mission objectives? 
Precedence Constraints. Sequential dependencies across the 
functions. To what extent do functions depend on the successful 
prior completion of other functions? 
Temporal Constraints. Are there fixed windows of 
opportunities or fixed time schedules associated with particular 
functions? 
Spatial Constraints. Does performance of the function depend 
on being at a particular place or location? 
Structural Understanding. Does the agent have the appropriate 
knowledge or know how (e.g., right training for operators or right 
Programming for automation) to accomplish the functions? 
Information Availability. Does the agent have adequate 
information (good situation awareness) for completing the 
function? 
Resource Availability. Does the agent have adequate 
information processing capacity (e.g., attention; memory, 
computational power) or physical capacity (e.g., free hand) to 
accomplish the function? 
Effector Capability. Is the agent capable of performing the 
actions necessary to complete the function? Can the agent 
respond in time with the appropriate precision? 
Shared Mental Models. Do the cooperating agents have a 
common or compatible vision (e.g., common assumptions, shared 
rationality) of the problem domain? 
Information Coupling. Is there sufficient information for each 
agent to know what and how other agents are doing? 
Effector and Resource Complimentarity. Do the effector and 
resource capabilities of the team span the demands of the work 
domain? 
Authority Structure. How are dynamic decisions about 
allocation handled (e.g., central authority, first-come, consensus, 
volunteer, etc.)? How are conflicts resolved?  
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V.A. Wüd Weasel. 
The Wild Weasel aircraft were designed to counter the SAM threat during the 
Vietnam War. A two-seat aircraft (originally F-100F Super Sabers, later F-4s) was 
configured so that the backseat operator had a radar homing and warning system 
(RHAWS) that could be used to determine the location of active SAM sites. The back 
seat operator was an electronic warfare officer (EWO) more commonly referred to as a 
Bear (or Gray Bear). The Wild Weasel mission was extremely dangerous. Clancy 
(1995) notes that "being on a Weasel crew was statistically suicidal in the early years of 
the Vietnam conflict."  A typical tactic, code named Iron Hand, involved a formation of 
four aircraft attacking a SAM site that threatened the strike force. Typically, two Wild 
Weasels would carry air-to-ground missals and two more would carry more conventional 
bombs or cluster bombs. 
With reference to the functional decomposition shown in the lower part of Figure 
rV.l the EWO (or Bear) had primary responsibility for navigation, ECM (electronic 
countermeasures), ESM (electronic support measures), and weapons operation. The pilot 
was functionally a "bus driver" (quote from an anonymous EWO) who was primarily 
concerned with flight control. Although the pilot was always formally in command, 
much of the information for setting target priorities and evading threats was presented on 
the RHAWS, so the Bear was functionally very much involved in the moment-to-moment 
command and control decisions. The Bear had electronic information for BDA, but the 
pilot was in a better position to visually assess battle damage. 
It is likely, that the "bus driver" function of flying will largely be automated in a 
UCAV system. Thus, the UCAV operator may function more like a Bear, than like a 
pilot (although the current operational Air Force UAV, Predator, is controlled by a 
qualified pilot). 
V. B. Summary 
At this level of analysis consideration is given to the resources and preferences of 
individual agents (7) with respect to the problem of role allocation (5). One can begin to 
match the requirements (tasks (2), decisions (3), strategies (4)) that are reflected in the 
functional flow to the resources and preferences of various cognitive agents (7). In 
addition, it is important to understand the management style and culture (6) in order to 
understand how organizational constraints shape the allocation of function. For example, 
will the Air Force permit nonpilots to be the command authorities of unmanned combat 
aircraft or will the pilot centered culture demand that pilots retain authority, even for 
unmanned vehicles? 
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VI. ACTIVITY ANALYSIS 
The activity analysis represents the most detailed level of analysis. This level of 
analysis examines the behavior of the system, generally with respect to the dimensions of 
space and time. What actions or procedures are done; when; and where? For example, 
Figure X (from Worch et al., 1997) gives an example profile for a SEAD mission. 
Compare this representation to the functional flow diagrams shown in Figure VII. The 
connections in Figure VIII represent the flow of information within control loops. The 
connections in Figure VIII represent order in time (sequence) — plan, take-off depart, 
enroute & orbit, acquire target, attack, return to orbit, etc. The boxes in Figure VII 
represent the processing of information. The boxes in Figure VIII represent activities that 
have a start and an end. The feedback arrows in Figure VIII represent control loops 
(information feedback). The feedback arrows in Figure X represent iteration loops (i.e., 


























Figure VIII. A profile of the flow of activities for a potential SEAD mission (from 
Worch, 8 Oct 1997). 
An alternative representation for activities is a spatial map. For example, Figure 
IX shows a segment from a SEAD mission flown by two F4-Gs. At Point 1 the two F4 s 
turn toward the SAM site to "stimulate the environment" and begin "working" the target. 
At Point 2 the radar signals from the SAM site are detected and the F4s split and begin 
flying tangent to the target. This tangent path allows the targeting systems to get multiple 
lines of position (LOPs) so that range to the target can be computed precisely. At Point 3 
accurate range information has been acquired. However, the SAM has locked on and 
targeted US2. US2 begins evasive action and begins an egress from the target to create 
time and distance between it and any missals. At the same time, US1 turns toward the 
SAM and at Point 4 releases a missile ("Magnum, magnum!") in the direction of the 




Figure IX. Two F4s work a single SAM site. 
A time-line is another format for characterizing the events. Figure X was 
taken from an account of a training mission with two aircraft equipped with the 
harm targeting system (HTS) (North, 1997). This representation shows the 
sequence and relative timing of events. Annotations indicate some spatial aspects 
of the mission that are not graphically represented in this format. In this particular 
sequence, one aircraft's targeting system malfunctions. A data link is established 
and this plane is able to launch on the SAM sites using target information from the 
HTS of the second plane. 
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Figure X. A time line showing the sequence of events during a two aircraft 
training mission using the harm targeting system (North, 1997). 
Another format, Figure XI (Shalin & Jaques, 1997), is for showing space-time 
properties of a generic mission. This particular representation shows altitude as a 











Figure XL A mission profile for a Weasel as a function of time and altitude. 
Figures VIII, IX, X and XI show activities in the context of physical space and 
time. Figure XU is a representation for showing activity in a cognitive or information 
space (Shalin & Jaques, 1997). This representation shows plans as boxes and goals for 
those plans as ovals. Figure XU shows the information processes involved in locating 
targets using information from the APR-38 Radar Attack and Warning System (RAWS) 
in the Wild Weasel. Three elements of the RAWS are involved. A PPI display is an 
egocentric (plane at the center) representation of the battle space. S AMs are represented 
as alphanumeric symbols. The location of these symbols indicates the bearing to the 
target. A digital display has two modes. In one mode, the range, radio frequency, pulses 
per second, and scan frequency are displayed. In the other mode, power, pulse width, 
scan duration, and scan type are displayed. A Panoramic display provides a graphical 
display of the radio frequency characteristics. The plan goal graph provides a very 
detailed description of information processing activities. 
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Figure XII. A plan goal graph showing information processing activities associated 
with using the APR-38 RAWS to identify targets and threats (Shalin & Jaques, 1997). 
It is important to note that the "goals" in the plan goal graph are different than the 
goals discussed in Section II of this report. The goals in the plan-goal graph represent the 
goals for specific information processing activities. The activities in the plan goal graph 
are tightly constrained by the details of the interface that the operator is using. The 
mission goals reflect constraints at a much higher level of abstraction, such as military 
doctrine. Thus, these two types of goals differ in both level of decomposition and level 
of abstraction. For this reason, the goals discussed in Section II are not simply the sum of 
the goals represented in the plan-goal graph. Cognitive systems are nonlinear. It would 
be very difficult to discover military doctrine in the activities of the EWO processing 
information from the RAWS. Conversely, it would be difficult to predict the activities 
from a decomposition of military doctrine into smaller and smaller subgoals. The 
important point is that the view from above and the view from below provide different 
perspectives and offer different insight about the SEAD mission. It is not simply a matter 
of where you start your analysis. The analysis must proceed at all levels. No level is 
privileged. No level provides a comprehensive view. Complete understanding requires 
viewing the system from multiple perspectives. Figure XV attempts to emphasize the 
fact that levels along the diagonal of the analysis matrix provide different perspectives on 
the total work space. Activity analysis helps us to see what people do, but analyses at 
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higher levels of abstraction are necessary to fully understand why people do what they 
do. Thus, it might not be possible to generate activities from decomposition of mission 
objectives or to derive mission objectives from integration of activities. Nevertheless, the 
activities should make sense in the context of the mission goals. The two perspectives 
should complement each other. If they don't, then that is an indication that there are 












Figure XIII. This figure emphasizes that the "goals" in the plan-goal graph and the 
mission objectives discussed earlier reflect both different levels of decomposition and 
different levels of abstraction. These analyses provide qualitatively different insights 
into the cognitive system. 
This has been just a small sample of the many kinds of representations that might 
be important to an activity analysis. There are many other possible representations. For 
example, detailed spatial layouts of controls and displays might be very important for an 
activity analysis. There is an enormous amount of information at the bottom of 
Rasmussen's pyramid. It would be impossible to capture every detail of the activity. 
Thus, the analyst must sample the population of activities wisely. Analyses at higher 
levels of abstraction can help to inform hypotheses about what details might be important 
and what details might be ignored. But the analyst has to be open to surprise and has to 
be prepared to assess and revise hypotheses that were formed from analyses at higher 
levels of abstraction. 
Also, it is important to note that the activity level is the level where change is 
most dynamic. A small change in the design (e.g., configuration of a display or 
automation of a subfunction) can have radical consequences for work activities. In some 
respects, the higher levels of abstraction represent the givens of the design problem and 
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the lower levels represent solution to the design problem. That is, design is to shape the 
activities to conform to the value systems that define the mission requirements. 
In relation to the overall analysis framework (Figure I, Page 11), activity analysis 
reflects the confluence of a situation and awareness constraints. An activity represents a 
path through the SEAD problem space. This path might reflect the choices of a particular 
agent (7) in response to a particular sequence of events or might represent normative 
considerations with respect to a task situation (2), a decision task (3), or a mental strategy 
(4). Our ability to make sense of activities in light of analyses at higher levels of 
abstraction is an important test of our understanding of the system. 
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VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Suppression of enemy air defenses — as an agglomeration of high-technology 
weapons and apparatus, old and new tactics, and traditional forces and concepts — 
engenders the same paradoxes that befell the tank, the airplane, the submarine of 
World War I, and nuclear weapons of World War II. Modern SEAD weapons and 
concepts arrived on the scene long before holistic patterns of use were developed for 
them. The impetus to develop SEAD weapons unwittingly brought about war-fighting 
technologies that had unforeseen consequences on the modern battlefield. SEAD 
weapons and tactics accelerated modern warfare's evolutionary process so much that 
traditional methods of determining effectiveness for SEAD no longer make much 
sense (Brungess, 1994, p. 51, emphasis added). 
The goal of the cognitive task analysis outlined in this report is to frame general 
and specific design questions with respect to "holistic patterns of use." General issues 
include assessment of information and control requirements and hypotheses about 
function integration (Geddes, 1997). Specific questions include hypotheses about the 
most effective use of automation, the best representations to be used in displays, the type 
and format of controls, the structure of teams, the criterion for selecting personnel, and 
the structure of training programs. 
What has been discovered in the process of this analysis? At the start of the 
analysis, the image of a SEAD mission was of a small team of aircraft attacking a SAM 
site. This image reflects an historical perspective grounded in the experiences from 
Vietnam. In this image, SEAD was defensive (reactive) and piecemeal. This image has 
greatly expanded as a result of this tabletop analysis. SEAD is now viewed in the context 
of broad Air Force Doctrine and in the larger context of electromagnetic warfare. SEAD 
has evolved. SEAD of the future will be more offensive (proactive) and will be an 
integral part of a highly coordinated effort directed at an integrated air defense system 
(IADS). This is the image that ought to be guiding the design of UCAVs. UCAVs 
should not be thought of as a replacement for the Wild Weasel—because, if that is the 
basis for design, then UCAVs will be obsolete before they are even fielded. UCAVs 
must be designed as integral components within a global strategy to disable IADS. The 
role of UAVs in the global strategy will include reconnaissance, jamming, deception, and 
weapons delivery. 
Because of the secondary objective to illustrate the CSE approach, efforts were 
made to scale the work analysis to a manageable mission. For this reason, the image of a 
few planes attacking a few SAM missile sites was very attractive. It was difficult to let 
go of this image and that image still dominates sections of this analysis. However, this is 
the power of the cognitive systems approach—it forces the analyst to confront the larger 
context of work. From an engineering perspective, simplification of a problem can be a 
very powerful heuristic that allows the application of powerful analytic techniques. In 
the world of Henry Ford (who could proclaim that the customers could have what ever 
color they wanted as long as it was black), the design environment was such that the 
simplifying assumptions could be justified in practice. However, this is less true today. 
Projections based on linear logic (e.g., the prediction of the paperless office) do not 
reflect the reality of an information age where interactions dominate. This is especially 
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true for a domain like electromagnetic warfare. We can't scale the problem to fit our 
methods. The methods must be scaled up to the problem. The problem of 
electromagnetic warfare is huge with significant interactions as a result of technological, 
economic, and political forces. The CSE approach is not going to simplify this problem- 
-however, it is a formidable conceptual tool that might help the analyst to fully appreciate 
the nature of this complex work domain. 
This report simply scratches the surface. It represents a preliminary tabletop 
analysis of the problem where most of the information was obtained from publications in 
general circulation. This tabletop analysis is an important first step in a continuing task 
analysis. The tabletop analysis provides access to "conventional wisdom" with respect to 
the SEAD mission. It helps to establish general dimensions of the problem space; to 
learn the appropriate vocabulary; and to identify the appropriate domain experts. A next 
logical step toward a more complete analysis would include interviews with domain 
experts. 
VII. A Interviewing Domain Experts 
Who are the domain experts? Classical approaches to cognitive task analysis 
have focused on the "users" of the system as the domain experts. This is due to the 
assumption that design should be to support the "mental models" of these users. 
However, a CSE approach is directed at the work space (not the space between any 
particular operator's ears) (See Vicente 1997). Certainly, users are one source of 
information about this space. However, the understanding of operators is often 
incomplete. 
The people who might provide deeper insights into the SEAD mission include 
EWOs and pilots who have experience with the manned SEAD mission; experts on 
electromagnetic warfare and technology (including radar operators, image analysts, radar 
system designers, and engineers); experts on UAV technology (including UAV operators, 
UAV designers and engineers); experts on military strategy and tactics (including experts 
on IADS and experts on air superiority representing multiple service branches). 
The interviews provide a check on our understanding of the "conventional 
wisdom." They also provide a first look at "conventional practice." In the past, cognitive 
task analyses have found that practice sometimes diverges from the conventional wisdom 
captured in text books. There are many possible reasons for this. Sometimes practice 
reflects contextual constraints not considered in the text book. Often, practice is ahead of 
conventional wisdom in adapting to changes that arise as a result of new technologies or 
as a result of changing economic or social climates. In addition, interviews also provide 
an opportunity to detect "unconventional wisdom." Unconventional wisdom reflects 
individual insights that are not well known, but that once expressed can be recognized by 
other experts as creative and innovative solutions. Finally, the interviews can be a source 
of "contradictions." Particularly with new technologies, there will be disagreements 
among experts. For example, there seems to be some disagreement in the published 
literature about the wisdom of replacing the Wild Weasel with aircraft armed with the 
HARM targeting system (HTS). The arguments among experts can provide important 
insights about the work domain. 
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VII.B Field Observations 
In addition to talking to experts, it is also valuable to observe the work domain. 
Just as conventional wisdom and conventional practice may diverge, behavior may not 
always be consistent with verbal reports. There are many facets of expertise that are very 
difficult to articulate accurately. Thus, it is important to observe behavior in actual work 
settings. For the SEAD mission, particularly UCAV SEAD, observations in the actual 
domain are difficult (due to the breakout of peace and due to the fact that UCAVs are 
only at a conceptual stage of development). However, there are two environments where 
observations might be made. One environment is electronic combat exercises such as the 
Air Force's Green Flag and Cope Thunder. It could be very informative to follow one of 
these exercises from start to finish. A second environment is reconnaissance UAV 
operation. There are both training facilities and operational facilities where observations 
of UAV operators might be made. 
VII. C Experimental Evaluation 
Eventually, it may be important to test hypotheses derived from tabletop analysis, 
interviews, and observations in more controlled environments. These environments 
might include both low fidelity part task simulations and rich high fidelity simulations. 
The validity of these observations will depend critically on the ability to replicate 
meaningful chunks of the work domain in the laboratory. This reflects the iterative 
nature of the cognitive task analysis process. A goal of the analysis is to discover 
meaning within a work domain. These discoveries then become the basis for defining 
"high fidelity" for a simulator. Then, that simulator is used to evaluate hypothesis arising 
from the analysis. There is a clear danger here of confirmation bias. For this reason, it is 
important to iterate between the simulator and the operational environment. Ultimately, 
the analysis loop must be closed through the actual work domain. When inferences drawn 
in the simulator are inconsistent with observations in the operational environment this 
feedback must be used to improve the fidelity of the simulation. 
VII. D Supporting Design 
Ultimately the goal of the cognitive systems analysis is to support design. Thus, 
the products ofthat analysis should be useful to designers. For the most part, designers 
are unlikely to read a report such as this. Thus, it is important to develop alternative 
representations for the information and insights accumulated during the task analysis. In 
parallel with the development of this report, a tentative framework for a hypertext 
environment is being developed. This hypertext environment would be structured in a 
way that was consistent with the nested hierarchical structure of Rasmussen's abstraction 
hierarchy. The linking facilities of the hypertext format would be used to map across 
levels of the nested hierarchy to capture the semantic links. The hypertext document is 
called ICE—integrated constraint environment. The hypothesis is that the combination 
of a nested hierarchical structure and the hypertext links will provide a more effective 
representation than the narrative format of this document. In addition to text, the ICE 
environment would incorporate many different graphical representations within it 
(including functional flow diagrams, concept maps, plan goal graphs, time histories, 
interface schematics, etc). 
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Also, for complex systems, and particularly for competitive environments like 
electromagnetic combat, design is never complete. The system is constantly adapting in 
response to changing threat environments and technological innovations. Thus, the 
cognitive task analysis has to be a "living" analysis that can grow with the system as it 
evolves. The hypertext environment proposed for ICE will be designed to allow it to 
evolve to reflect deeper understandings of the work domain and evolutions within the 
work domain in response to new technologies and threats. The ICE program will be 
designed to be a living memory that captures the design rationale for the evolving system. 
VILE Summary 
This report is a small first step to understanding the evolving SEAD work domain. 
The hope is that this first step will eventually lead to a deeper understanding of the SEAD 
mission. This deeper understanding may, in turn, guide the design and evaluation of 
UCAV technology so that it will be suited to the requirements of the SEAD mission. As 
the quote from Hancock (1996), which closes this report, emphasizes, we hope to 
eventually understand how UCAVs can work and why they may be useful (or not) for 
accomplishing the SEAD mission. 
The report is also intended to illustrate the CSE approach to work analysis. Using 
the CSE framework, the SEAD mission was evaluated from multiple levels of abstraction 
and at different levels of decomposition. Although the current analysis is preliminary, 
hopefully the reader can begin to appreciate the scope and power of the cognitive systems 
approach for relating the causal (how) and the functional (why) questions that form the 
basis of any design problem. 
Science and technology have always tried to answer the question "how? " How does 
this or that mechanism work? What are the laws and causal properties that underlie 
this phenomenon and, in the case of technologies, how can such knowledge be used to 
develop a useful tool or machine? However, science and technology rarely, if ever, 
address the question "Why? " It seems to be outside their respective universe of 
discourse. The question is ruled inadmissible or inappropriate for the methods and 
capabilities at hand. I reject this absolutely. I submit that questions of how and why 
are so mutually dependent that they should never be considered independently, and I 
attribute much of our present circumstance to this unfortunate and unhappy division. 
Those who know how must always ask why. Those who ask why must always think 
how. (Hancock, 1996) 
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